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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 draft-ietf-radext-ieee802ext

Network Working Group                                      Bernard Aboba
INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Microsoft
Category: Proposed Standard
<draft-aboba-radext-wlan-00.txt>
3 July 2005


                       RADIUS Attributes for WLAN

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 10, 2005.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   IEEE 802.11i defines the use of EAP authentication with IEEE 802.11
   wireless LANs.  Although AAA support is optional within IEEE 802.11i,
   it is expected that many IEEE 802.11i authenticators will function as
   AAA clients.  This document proposes additional attributes for use by
   IEEE 802.11 authenticators.  The attributes defined in this document
   are compatible with those used within Diameter EAP.







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Table of Contents

1.     Introduction ..........................................    3
   1.1       Terminology .....................................    3
   1.2       Requirements Language ...........................    4
2.     RADIUS Attributes .....................................    4
   2.1       Allowed-SSID ....................................    4
   2.2       Allowed-Called-Station-Id .......................    5
   2.3       EAP-Key-Name ....................................    5
   2.4       EAP-Master-Session-Key ..........................    6
   2.5       EAP-Peer-ID .....................................    7
   2.6       EAP-Server-ID ...................................    8
3.     RADIUS Accounting .....................................    9
   3.1       Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method ......................    9
4.     Table of Attributes ...................................   10
5.     Diameter Considerations ...............................   11
6.     IANA Considerations ...................................   11
7.     Security Considerations ...............................   11
   7.1       Dictionary Attacks ..............................   12
   7.2       Key Management Issues ...........................   12
8.     References ............................................   13
  8.1  Normative References ..................................   13
  8.2  Informative References ................................   13
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..............................................   14
AUTHORS' ADDRESSES ...........................................   15
Intellectual Property Statement ..............................   15
Copyright Statement ..........................................   15
Disclaimer of Validity .......................................   16























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1.  Introduction

   In situations where it is desirable to centrally manage
   authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) for IEEE 802.11
   wireless LANs, deployment of a backend authentication and accounting
   server is desirable.  In such situations, it is expected that IEEE
   802.11 authenticators will function as AAA clients.  This document
   defines additional attributes suitable for usage by IEEE 802.11
   authenticators acting as AAA clients.

1.1.  Terminology

This document uses the following terms:

Access Point (AP)
          A Station that provides access to the distribution services
          via the wireless medium for associated Stations.

Association
          The service used to establish Access Point/Station mapping and
          enable Station invocation of the distribution system services.

authenticator
          An authenticator is an entity that require authentication from
          the supplicant.  The authenticator may be connected to the
          supplicant at the other end of a point-to-point LAN segment or
          802.11 wireless link.

authentication server
          An authentication server is an entity that provides an
          authentication service to an authenticator.  This service
          verifies from the credentials provided by the supplicant, the
          claim of identity made by the supplicant.

Station (STA)
          Any device that contains an IEEE 802.11 conformant medium
          access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) interface to the
          wireless medium (WM).

Supplicant
          A supplicant is an entity that is being authenticated by an
          authenticator.  The supplicant may be connected to the
          authenticator at one end of a point-to-point LAN segment or
          802.11 wireless link.







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1.2.  Requirements Language

   In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
   of the specification.  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
   "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY",
   and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

2.  RADIUS Attributes

2.1.  Allowed-SSID

   Description

      As described in [KEYFRAME] Section 2.5, it may be desirable for
      the RADIUS server to be able to restrict the scope of the AAA-Key
      provided to the RADIUS client.  In particular, it may be desirable
      to restrict the use of the key to a set of authorized SSIDs.  The
      Allowed-SSID attribute allows the RADIUS server to specify which
      SSIDs the user is allowed to access.  One or more Allowed-SSID
      attributes MAY be included an Access-Accept packet. This attribute
      is not allowed in other RADIUS packets.  A summary of the Allowed-
      SSID Attribute format is shown below.  The fields are transmitted
      from left to right.

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |  Length       |            String...
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Code

      TBD

   Length

      >=3

   String

      The String field contains one or more octets, encoding a single
      SSID, as defined in [IEEE-802.11].  UTF-8 encoded 10646 characters
      are recommended, but a robust implementation SHOULD support the
      field as undistinguished octets.






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2.2.  Allowed-Called-Station-Id

   Description

      As described in [KEYFRAME] Section 2.5, it may be desirable for
      the RADIUS server to be able to restrict the scope of the AAA-Key
      provided to the RADIUS client.  In particular, it may be desirable
      to restrict the use of the key to a set of authorized Called-
      Station-Ids.  The Allowed-Called-Station-Id attribute allows the
      RADIUS server to specify which Called-Station-Ids the user is
      allowed to access.  More than one Allowed-Called-Station-Id
      attribute may be included in an Access-Accept packet.  This
      attribute is not allowed in other RADIUS packets.  A summary of
      the Allowed-Called-Station-ID Attribute format is shown below.
      The fields are transmitted from left to right.

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |  Length       |            String...
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Code

      TBD

   Length

      >=3

   String

      The String field is one or more octets, containing the layer 2
      endpoint that the user's call terminated on.  For details of the
      encoding, see [RFC2865] and [RFC3580].  A robust implementation
      SHOULD support the field as undistinguished octets.

2.3.  EAP-Key-Name

   Description

      The EAP-Key-Name Attribute contains the key name associated with
      the EAP-Master-Session-Key attribute.  Exactly how this attribute
      is used depends on the link layer in question.  See [KEYFRAME] for
      more discussion.

      It should be noted that not all link layers use this name and
      existing EAP method implementations do not generate it.  An EAP-



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      Key-Name attribute MAY only be included within Access-Request and
      Access-Accept packets.  A summary of the EAP-Key-Name Attribute
      format is shown below.  The fields are transmitted from left to
      right.

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |  Length       |          String...
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Code

      TBD [DiamEAP]

   Length

      >=3

   String

      The String field, when present, is one or more octets, containing
      the EAP Session-ID, as defined in [KEYFRAME] Section 2.4.  Since
      the NAS operates as a pass-through in EAP, it cannot know the EAP
      Session-ID before receiving it from the RADIUS server.  As a
      result, an EAP-Key-Name attribute sent in an Access-Request MUST
      NOT contain any data.  A RADIUS server receiving an Access-Request
      with a EAP-Key-Name attribute with non-empty data MUST silently
      discard the attribute.  In addition, the RADIUS server SHOULD
      include this attribute in an Access-Accept only if an empty EAP-
      Key-Name attribute was present in the Access-Request.

2.4.  EAP-Master-Session-Key

   Description

      The EAP-Master-Session-Key Attribute contains an EAP Master
      Session Key (MSK), used as keying material for protecting the
      communications between the user and the NAS.  Exactly how this
      keying material is used depends on the link layer in question, and
      is beyond the scope of this document.  For more discussion on the
      MSK, see [RFC3748] and [KEYFRAME].  The EAP-Master-Session-Key
      attribute MAY be included in a RADIUS Access-Accept.  This
      attribute is not allowed in other RADIUS packets.







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       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |  Length       |            String...
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Code

      TBD [DiamEAP]

   Length

      >=3

   String

      The String field is one or more octets, containing an EAP Master
      Session Key (MSK), encrypted using AES Key Wrap with 128-bit KEK
      as described in [RFC3394] Section 4.1.

      The KEK is derived from the RADIUS shared secret (K) and the
      Request Authenticator (R) as follows:

      KEK = PRF(K, "EAP MSK KEK" || R, 128)

      The PRF algorithm is based on PRF+ from IKEv2 shown below ("|"
      denotes concatenation)

      K = Key, S = Seed, LEN = output length, represented as binary
      in a single octet.

      PRF (K,S,LEN) = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ... where:

      T1 = HMAC-SHA256(K, S | LEN | 0x01)
      T2 = HMAC-SHA256(K, T1 | S | LEN | 0x02)
      T3 = HMAC-SHA256(K, T2 | S | LEN | 0x03)
      T4 = HMAC-SHA256(K, T3 | S | LEN | 0x04)

2.5.  EAP-Peer-ID

   Description

      The EAP-Peer-ID Attribute contains an the Peer-ID generated by the
      EAP method.  Exactly how this name is used depends on the link
      layer in question.  See [KEYFRAME] for more discussion.  The EAP-
      Peer-ID attribute is only allowed in Access-Request and Access-
      Accept packets.




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      It should be noted that not all link layers use this name, and
      existing EAP method implementations do not generate it.  Since the
      NAS operates as a pass-through in EAP, it cannot know the EAP-
      Peer-ID before receiving it from the RADIUS server.  As a result,
      an EAP-Peer-ID attribute sent in an Access-Request MUST NOT
      contain any data.  A home RADIUS server receiving an Access-
      Request an EAP-Peer-ID attribute with non-empty data MUST silently
      discard the attribute.  In addition, the home RADIUS server SHOULD
      include this attribute an Access-Accept only if an empty EAP-Peer-
      ID attribute was present in the Access-Request.  An EAP-Peer-ID
      attribute MUST NOT be included within an Access-Challenge.  A
      summary of the EAP-Peer-ID Attribute format is shown below.  The
      fields are transmitted from left to right.

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |  Length       |            String...
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Code

      TBD

   Length

      >=3

   String

      The String field is one or more octets, containing the EAP Peer-ID
      exported by the EAP method.  For details, see [KEYFRAME] Appendix
      E.  A robust implementation SHOULD support the field as
      undistinguished octets.

2.6.  EAP-Server-ID

   Description

      The EAP-Server-ID Attribute contains the Server-ID generated by
      the EAP method.  Exactly how this name is used depends on the link
      layer in question.  See [KEYFRAME] for more discussion.  The EAP-
      Server-ID attribute is only allowed in Access-Request and Access-
      Accept packets.

      It should be noted that not all link layers use this name, and
      existing EAP method implementations do not generate it.  Since the
      NAS operates as a pass-through in EAP, it cannot know the EAP-



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      Server-ID before receiving it from the RADIUS server.  As a
      result, an EAP-Server-ID attribute sent in an Access-Request MUST
      NOT contain any data.  A home RADIUS server receiving in an
      Access-Request an EAP-Server-ID attribute with non-empty data MUST
      silently discard the attribute.  In addition, the home RADIUS
      server SHOULD include this attribute an Access-Accept only if an
      empty EAP-Server-ID attribute was present in the Access-Request.
      An EAP-Server-ID attribute MUST NOT be included within an Access-
      Challenge.  A summary of the EAP-Server-ID Attribute format is
      shown below.  The fields are transmitted from left to right.

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |  Length       |            String...
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Code

      TBD

   Length

      >=3

   String

      The String field is one or more octets, containing the EAP Server-
      ID exported by the EAP method.  For details, see [KEYFRAME].  A
      robust implementation SHOULD support the field as undistinguished
      octets.

3.  RADIUS Accounting

3.1.  Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method

   Description

      Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method enables a RADIUS client to include the
      EAP method utilized within an accounting packet.  The semantics of
      this attribute are identical to that of the Accounting-EAP-Auth-
      Method AVP defined in [DiamEAP], Section 4.1.5.  The Accounting-
      EAP-Auth-Method attribute is only allowed in Accounting-Request
      packets.

   The Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method attribute is shown below.  The fields
   are transmitted from left to right:




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       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |  Length       |            Vendor-ID          |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |          Vendor-ID            |           Vendor-Type
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |          Vendor-Type          |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Type

      TBD  [DiamEAP]

   Length

      10

   Vendor-ID

      The Vendor-Id is 4 octets and represents the SMI Network
      Management Private Enterprise Code of the Vendor in network byte
      order, as allocated by IANA.  A Vendor-Id of zero is reserved for
      use by the IETF in providing an expanded global EAP Type space.

   Vendor-Type

      The Vendor-Type field is four octets and represents the vendor-
      specific EAP method Type.  If the Vendor-Id is zero, the Vendor-
      Type field is an extension and superset of the existing namespace
      for EAP Types.  For more information, see [RFC3748], Section 5.7.

4.  Table of Attributes

   The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be found
   in which kinds of packets, and in what quantity.

   Access-   Access-  Access-  Access-    CoA-
   Request   Accept   Reject   Challenge  Req     #    Attribute
   0         0+       0        0          0       TBD  Allowed-SSID
   0         0+       0        0          0       TBD  Allowed-Called-Station-Id
   0-1       0-1      0        0          0       TBD  EAP-Key-Name
   0         0-1      0        0          0       TBD  EAP-Master-Session-Key
   0-1       0-1      0        0          0       TBD  EAP-Peer-ID
   0-1       0-1      0        0          0       TBD  EAP-Server-ID






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   Actng-   Actng-
   Request  Response    #      Attribute
   0-1       0          TBD    Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method

   The following table defines the meaning of the above table entries.

     0     This attribute MUST NOT be present in packet.
     0+    Zero or more instances of this attribute MAY be
           present in the packet.
     0-1   Zero or one instance of this attribute MAY be
           present in the packet.

5.  Diameter Considerations

   Several of the attributes described in this document are already
   defined as RADIUS attributes within Diameter EAP.  These include EAP-
   Key-Name [DiamEAP], EAP-Master-Session-Key [DiamEAP] and Accounting-
   EAP-Auth-Method [DiamEAP].

   Since Diameter packets are always encrypted, within Diameter EAP the
   EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP is always sent in cleartext.  However in
   RADIUS encryption may not be used, so that the EAP-Master-Session-Key
   attribute needs to be encrypted on a hop-by-hop basis, using the
   RADIUS shared secret.

   New attributes not previously defined in Diameter EAP include EAP-
   Peer-ID, EAP-Server-ID, Allowed-SSID and Allowed-Called-Station-ID.
   When used with Diameter EAP, all of these attributes should be
   considered optional.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This specification does not create any new registries.

   This specification requires assignment of a RADIUS attribute types
   for the following attributes:

   Attribute                     Type
   =========                     ====
   Allowed-SSID                  TBD
   Allowed-Called-Station-Id     TBD
   EAP-Peer-ID                   TBD
   EAP-Server-ID                 TBD

7.  Security Considerations

   Since this document describes the use of RADIUS for purposes of
   authentication, authorization, and accounting in WLANs, it is



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   vulnerable to all of the threats that are present in other RADIUS
   applications. For a discussion of these threats, see [RFC2607],
   [RFC2865], [RFC3162], [RFC3576], [RFC3579], and [RFC3580].

   However, there are several additional threats worth discussing:

   Dictionary attacks
   Key management issues

7.1.  Dictionary Attacks

   As discussed in [RFC3579] Section 4.3.3, the RADIUS shared secret is
   vulnerable to offline dictionary attack, based on capture of the
   Response Authenticator or Message-Authenticator attribute.  The use
   of AES Keywrap to protect the EAP-Master-Session-Key attribute does
   not mitigate this vulnerability, since an attacker obtaining the
   RADIUS shared secret will have all the information necessary to
   obtain the EAP MSK.

   In order to decrease the level of vulnerability, [RFC2865], Section 3
   recommends:

      The secret (password shared between the client and the RADIUS
      server) SHOULD be at least as large and unguessable as a well-
      chosen password.  It is preferred that the secret be at least 16
      octets.

   In addition, the risk of an offline dictionary attack can be reduced
   by employing IPsec ESP with non-null transform in order to encrypt
   the RADIUS conversation, as described in [RFC3579], Section 4.2.

7.2.  Key Management Issues

   As detailed in [Housley], AAA protocols transporting keys are
   required to protect them against disclosure to third parties.  In
   Diameter EAP [DiamEAP] this is accomplished by use of the Diameter
   re-direct mechanism, enabling transport of keys directly between the
   NAS and the home AAA server.

   Diameter redirect relies on scalable mechanisms for establishment of
   security associations between the NAS and home AAA server, such as
   provisioning of certificates.  While this can be accommodated by use
   of RADIUS over IPsec, as specified in [RFC3579], this is not yet
   widely deployed.  Given this, it does not appear practical at this
   time to define an equivalent re-direct mechanism within RADIUS and
   require its use with the attributes defined in this document.

   Accordingly, the keying material included in the EAP-Master-Session-



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   Key attribute is encrypted on a hop-by-hop basis and is accessible to
   RADIUS proxies in the path.  The security requirements defined in
   [Housley] can therefore only be satisfied if RADIUS clients are
   configured to talk directly to RADIUS servers without proxies.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative references

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
          Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March, 1997.

[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson, W. and S. Willens, "Remote
          Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June
          2000.

[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
          Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.

[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J. and H.
          Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
          3748, June 2004.

[DiamEAP] Eronen, P., Hiller, T. and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
          Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", draft-ietf-aaa-
          eap-10.txt, Internet draft (work in progress), May 2005.

[KEYFRAME]
          Aboba, B., Simon, D., Arkko, J., Eronen, P. and H. Levkowetz,
          "EAP Key Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-06.txt,
          March 2005.

8.2.  Informative references

[Housley] Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "AAA Key Management", draft-housley-
          aaa-key-mgmt-00.txt, Internet draft (work in progress), June
          2005.

[IEEE-802]
          IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:
          Overview and Architecture, ANSI/IEEE Std 802, 1990.

[IEEE-802.11]
          Information technology - Telecommunications and information
          exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area
          networks - Specific Requirements Part 11:  Wireless LAN Medium
          Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications,
          IEEE Std. 802.11-2003, 2003.



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[IEEE-802.1X]
          IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port
          based Network Access Control, IEEE Std 802.1X-2004,  December
          2004.

[IEEE-802.11i]
          Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Supplement
          to Standard for Telecommunications and Information Exchange
          Between Systems - LAN/MAN Specific Requirements - Part 11:
          Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer
          (PHY) Specifications: Specification for Enhanced Security",
          IEEE 802.11i, July 2004.

[RFC2607] Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy
          Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999.

[RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.

[RFC3162] Aboba, B., Zorn, G. and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6", RFC
          3162, August 2001.

[RFC3575] Aboba, B., "IANA Considerations for RADIUS", RFC 3575, July
          2003.

[RFC3576] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D. and B. Aboba,
          "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication
          Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003.

[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS Support for Extensible
          Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.

[RFC3580] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G. and J. Roese,
          "IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
          (RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, September 2003.

[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., Arkko, J.,
          "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to acknowledge Dorothy Stanley of Agere, and
   Ashwin Palekar of Microsoft.









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Authors' Addresses

   Bernard Aboba
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA 98052

   EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
   Phone: +1 425 706 6605
   Fax:   +1 425 936 7329

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   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.







Aboba                       Proposed Standard                  [Page 15]


INTERNET-DRAFT         RADIUS Attributes for WLAN            3 July 2005


Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.

Open issues

   Open issues relating to this specification are tracked on the
   following web site:

   http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/RADEXT/


































Aboba                       Proposed Standard                  [Page 16]


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